NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY (G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)

FACTS: Petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against the respondent Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations Trade and Commerce and National Defense and Security concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,5 and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt. ISSUES: (1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system; (2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege; (3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions; and (4) whether or not respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. HELD: 1. Yes, there Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege.Presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public," that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters"; and that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power - the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on he being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of governments which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. 2. Yes,there Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege. Communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege because the elements of the presidential communications privilege are present. A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power." The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive."Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of substance.On the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor.25 The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. The inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government by no means prescribes absolute autonomy in the discharge by each branch of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. There is the corollary doctrine of checks and balances, which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches. Thus, by analogy, the fact that certain legislative acts require action from the President for their validity does not render such acts less legislative in nature. A good example is the power to pass a law. Article VI, Section 27 of the Constitution mandates that every bill passed by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President who shall approve or veto the same. The fact that the approval or vetoing of the bill is lodged with the President does not render the power to pass law executive in nature. This is because the power to pass law is generally a quintessential and non-delegable power of the Legislature. In the same vein, the executive power to enter or not to enter into a contract to secure foreign loans does not become less executive in nature because of conditions laid down in the Constitution. The final decision in the exercise of the said executive power is still lodged in the Office of the President. B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive. In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family.In determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest; and in balancing respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information. It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality.It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s communication with her advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product of the meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency. The Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. The decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to answer the said questions. The COur discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is not an absolute right.Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of legislation, not the people’s right to public information. 3.Yes, respondent Committees failed to Show that the Communications Elicited by the three questions are critical to the exercise of their functions to reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees’ power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation.While it is true that no impeachment proceeding has been initiated, however, complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed against President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. As the Court has said earlier, the prosecutorial and judicial arms of government are the bodies equipped and mandated by the Constitution and our laws to determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly in the NBN Project are true and, if so, who should be prosecuted and penalized for criminal conduct. 4.Yes,respondent committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. Clearly, petitioner’s request to be furnished an advance copy of questions is a reasonable demand that should have been granted by respondent Committees. In the present case, the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review is warranted because there appears to be a clear abuse of the power of contempt on the part of respondent Committees. As we have stressed before, petitioner is not an unwilling witness, and contrary to the assertion of respondent Committees, petitioner did not assume that they no longer had any other questions for him. He repeatedly manifested his willingness to attend subsequent hearings and respond to new matters. His only request was that he be furnished a copy of the new questions in advance to enable him to adequately prepare as a resource person. WHEREFORE, respondent Committees’ Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is hereby DENIED.

GARCILLANO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008)

FACTS: In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA and COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the elections to favor GMA. The recordings then became subject to legislative hearings conducted separately by each House. In his privilege speech, Sen. Escudero motioned a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. Lacson’s motion for a senate inquiry was referred to the Committee on National Defense and Security headed by Biazon. Garcillano subsequently filed 2 petitions. One to prevent the playing of the tapes in the each house for they are alleged to be inadmissible and the other to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation. ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci. HELD: Garci’s petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted. The tapes were already played in Congress and those tapes were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by these incidents hence it has become moot and academic. The second petition must be granted however. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.” The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session. The petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.

ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST V PURISIMA (G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008)

FACTS: The petition for prohibition was filed to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.Petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. 2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President. 3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a congressional oversight committee. HELD: 1. NO. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the instrumentality through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions–taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection. 2.No. RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act.Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest. 3.The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic. The petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.

DAVID VS ARROYO (G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006)

FACTS:

Seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition was filed against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for
alleged commission of grave abuse of discretion when she issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General
Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5)- declaring state of emergency during the 20th anniversary celebration of the EDSA People Power 1.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind
the executive issuance was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People's Army
(NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.[4] They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present
danger. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve
democratic institutions,are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the
Constitution. According to them the issuance of the proclamation and general order is void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.


HELD:

Both are partly constitutional and unconstitutional.The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the
provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated
by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to
take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.
whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.Ó Considering
that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The Petitions are partly granted.