CITY GOVERNMENT V ERICTA G.R. No. L-34915

FACTS: The Quezon City government enacted an ordinance “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”, whereby it requires that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. Quezon City justified the enacted ordinance by invoking police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

MMDA VS BEL-AIR (G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000)

FACTS: On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. On January 2, 1996, respondent filed a petition aainst MMDA before the Regional Trial Court OF MAKATI with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day. Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA and it is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a private residential subdivision in Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila One of their claim is that one of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA can exercise Police Power. HELD: No,The MMDA is not a political unit of government. It was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority."It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. The MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street,hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.

AMIGABLE vs CUENCA G.R. No. L-26400

FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Amigable is a registered owner of a lot, of which a portion of it was used by the government without prior approriation or negotiated sale. Amigable's counsel wrote to the President of the Philippines, requesting payment for the portion of the lot that which had been expropriated by the government. Later on, Amigable filed a case against the Republic of the Philippines and Commissioner of Public Highways Nicolas Cuenca. She sought for the recovery of her ownership and possesion of the land, compensatory and moral damages, attorneys fees and the cost of the suit. The defendents claim that the action was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give its consent to be sued. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government. HELD: The court held that where the government takes away property from a private land owner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. The only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the taking.

In Re Joaquin T. Borromeo

Facts: The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court. Case 1: Cases involving Traders Royal Bank (TRB). The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners. Case 2: Cases involving United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB. Case 3: Cases involving Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC). The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection. Issue: Whether the respondent-accused is liable for constructive contempt? Held: Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.

Santos, et al. vs. Aranzanso, et al., No. L-23828, February 28, 1966

Facts: A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old, was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila. It was alleged that both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and could not be found in spite of diligent efforts to locate them; that since the war said minors have been abandoned; and that for years since their infancy, said children have been continuously been in petitioners’ care and custody. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. After due publication and hearing, the adoption court granted the petition for the adoption. Subsequently – eight years later – Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the former, stating among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate. Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator, asserting among others that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos is void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them. Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the deceased and mother of Paulina opposed also the petition of Simplicio and adopted the pleadings filed by Aranzanso. The Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to make a collateral attack against the adoption decree on the ground of failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab initio. Issue: WON a decree of adoption could be assailed collaterally in a settlement proceeding. Held: No. Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was abandoned, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices. Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports “any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children.” Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order. Hence, the CA erred in reviewing under a collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of the adopted children had abandoned them.

Lambino vs COMELEC G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

FACTS: On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative; 2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and HELD: 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states: Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.” The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. 2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

HASHIMOTO v DALTON ( 870 F. Supp. 1544, 1994)

FACTS: Plaintiff, Barbara M. Hashimoto, was employed as a Budget Analyst, GS-7, at Camp H.M. Smith from April 2, 1984 through June 2, 1986. She brings this action, generally alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation during and after her former federal employment pursuant to 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16. Just prior to Plaintiff's removal due to a reduction in force (RIF) in June 1986, she initiated her first of two administrative complaints. In that complaint ("Case 1"), Plaintiff alleged that, because of her race and/or gender, she was suspended without pay on two occasions, denied a within grade salary increase, and eventually lost her job when her position was RIF-fed. Later, while her first complaint was being investigated, Plaintiff filed her second administrative complaint ("Case 2") in which she has alleged that she suffered a negative *1548 referral by one of her former Marine Corps supervisors when she applied for a job with the Army in retaliation for filing her Case I administrative complaint.Both administrative complaints were consolidated for investigation and were the subject of an adversarial hearing before an Administrative Judge from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). There were two jury trials of the Case 1 claims because, at the time of trial, the law of this circuit entitled Plaintiff to a jury trial. The first trial ended in a verdict for Plaintiff, but that verdict was vacated and a new trial ordered on numerous grounds.A second trial was held on Case 1 and Case 2 was also tried before a jury. The jury verdicts in Case 1 and Case 2 are vacated in light of the United States Supreme Court's ruling that the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which provided for jury trials and compensatory damages were not retroactive in application. The Court and the parties were aware that the United States Supreme Court had heard arguments on the issue of retro-activity at the time of the second trial of Case 1. In light of the pending decision on retro-activity, and in order to avoid a third trial in the interests of judicial efficiency and economy, the parties were instructed to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the plaintiff suffered discrimination RULING The employer's burden is satisfied if he simply explains what he has done'. No discrimination done with the plaintiff. The plaintiff has the initial burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a mere pretext for discrimination. The two Case 1 issues which remain for adjudication are whether Plaintiff suffered unlawful discrimination when she was suspended for fourteen days and when she was denied a within grade increase. In this case, Defendant clearly articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions taken: Plaintiff was suspended for fourteen days because she did not produce a turnover folder (in any format) as she had been instructed to do and she was denied a WGI because her performance had been rated as marginal. Plaintiff's other allegations that she was treated differently than others who were Caucasian and/or male were all decisively rebutted by evidence or are insufficiently indicative of any discriminatory animus. Because Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden as to any of the Case 1 claims she has presented, judgment is has been ordered for Defendant. Read full text of the Case here:

People v. Paguntalan (G.R. No. 116272, March 27, 1995)

FACTS: On April 25, 1993, Arturo Tiu was fatally shot by Noel “Bobong” Paguntalan during a religious procession in Barangay Linaot, Ormoc City. Immediately after shooting, Noel ran to the enclosed premises of his employer, the accused-appellant, Jesus Sotto. The latter was also found guilty for allegedly confederating with Paguntalan in killing the victim by persuading him and that the unlicensed firearms used in the commission of the crime was also his. The bits of circumstances shown and explained collectively indicate that Noel Paguntalan, Jesus Sotto, and one or more unindicated individuals acted in concert, had a common design and understanding to kill Arturo Tiu. Though no direct evidence of conspiracy is shown in the evidence, this does not detract from the fact that the act of Noel Paguntalan in killing Arturo Tiu is also an act of his coconspirators. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent, Jesus Sotto is criminally liable. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Jesus Sotto is not criminally liable. The trial court’s insinuation that the fascination of accused-appellant with Django movies, as manifested by his preoccupation of wearing a hat similar to the hat worn by Django in the movies, is adequate foundation to jump to the conclusion that he would likewise be obsessed in possessing a .22 revolver like that used by Django in the movies. This kind of all opposition typifies the tradition fallacy anchored on non-sequitur and verisimilitude. At this juncture, the court observed that the magistrate had stretched his imagination beyond the parameters of reason. Probability can never genre as substitute for the requisite quantum of proof to establish the factum probans as to the ownership of the fatal weapon. Jurisprudence of recent vintage intrude that before conviction can he had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime and that circumstantial evidence should be acted upon with extreme caution. In the case at bench, we entertain serious doubts as to the "fact of agreement", as the same is drawn form after-events and anchored as it is on unfounded conjectures. Indeed, conclusions based on speculations cannot serve as basis for conviction. The Court cannot also subscribe to the proposition of the trial court that the low economic status of the triggerman is enough to lay the basis for concluding that the gun could have been supplied by accused-appellant for it is just like saying that only accused-appellant can purchase or supply the gun to the exclusion of other persons financially capable of owning a gun. It must be recalled that the gun used was unlicensed and there was thus no record on the ownership thereof. With these evidences and circumstances, the appealed is REVERSED and ACQUITTING accused-appellant of the crime charged due to reasonable doubt.

SY V FINEZA A.M. No. RTJ-03-1808. October 15, 2003

FACTS: A complaint filed by Radelia C. Sy with the Office of the Court Administrator, charging the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Branch 131), Judge Antonio J. Fineza, of bribery, grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a judge and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Petitioner Sy is accused of estafa and her case is pending before Judge Fineza. According to the petitioner, respondent, Judge Fineza, exerted undue and improper pressure on her by offering to dismiss the estafa case in exchange for P300,000. Otherwise, he threatened to convict complainant Sy of estafa regardless of her innocence. The second complaint further alleged that on May 23, 2001 complainant Sys counsel in other cases, Atty. Jubay, had relayed to her that Judge Fineza warned him that morning during a hearing that she had not been paying her other lawyers. Judge Fineza added that complainant Sy had been threatening to file a case against the former, and warned that if she does so, she could no longer appear or set foot in Caloocan City. This eventually led to the withdrawal of Atty. Jubay as complainant Sys counsel. Complainant Sy declared that she delivered money to Judge Fineza six times on separate occasions. Complainant Sy claimed that when she was unable to complete the remaining balance, Judge Fineza began harassing her. ISSUE: Whether the respondent has breached the norms and standards of the judiciary RULING: After assessing the pleadings and memoranda filed, along with the documents and affidavits attached, the investigating Justice saw no merit in the charge of bribery but found Judge Fineza guilty of simple misconduct. As found by the Supreme Court, bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, thus complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Complainant herein has only her friends to support her claims who would naturally testify in her favor. These two incidents clearly show Judge Finezas utter disrespect for the office he holds as a member of the judiciary. In the first instance, even assuming the absence of shouting, finger pointing and menacing stares, the admitted act of Judge Fineza in calling complainant Cato sinungaling in the hallway, already detracts from the equanimity and judiciousness that are required of a judge. As for describing one of the complainants witnesses as BAKLA in a pleading filed before this Court, resort to argumentum ad hominem is certainly most unbecoming of a judge, to say the least. While Judge Fineza denies that the conversation ever happened, the manifestation of Atty. Jubay cannot easily be dismissed as a fabrication. It was made by an officer of the court who could be held liable for contempt if the same is proven to be false. At this point, it bears noting that the manifestation was filed with the court of Judge Fineza and that he made no mention of ever having imposed sanctions on Atty. Jubay for making such allegations The integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have done justice. The assumption of office by a judge places upon him duties and restrictions peculiar to his exalted position. He must be perceived, not as a repository of arbitrary power, but as one who dispenses justice under the sanction of the rule of law. This Court has repeatedly reminded members of the judiciary to be irreproachable in conduct and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties, but also in their daily life. For no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. Respondent Judge Fineza is given one last chance to correct his ways and is sternly warned that one more transgression will merit his dismissal from the service. Respondent Judge Fineza is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) months, with the STERN WARNING that one more transgression will merit dismissal from the service.

MANE V JUDGE BELEN A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner Attorney Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the Office of the Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, of demeaning, humiliating, and berating him during the hearing on a case which he was a counsel for the plaintiff. In proving his claim, he cited remarks made by respondent in the course of the proceeding conducted. Respondent judge criticized the petitioner on the ground that he did not graduated from University of the Philippines College of Law. Based on the transcript of the stenographic notes, the respondent made also a threatening and boastful remarks to petitioner who is admittedly still young, unnecessary lecturing and debating, as well as unnecessary display of learning and showed a conceited display of arrogance as to the petitioner’s motion. Petitioner later withdrew his complaint, by letter of September 4, 2006, stating that it was a mere result of his impulsiveness. ISSUE: 1.Whether or not the statements and actions made by the respondent judge during the said hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. RULING: Respondent judge is guilty of conduct unbecoming during the trial. An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. The court ruled that Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and language. The OCA thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. Canon Rule 3.04 states that a judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants. A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent felt that his integrity and dignity were being assaulted, he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse. In this case, respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of the motion to inhibit filed by complainant, but, instead, he opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. If respondent judge felt that there is a need to admonish complainant Atty. Mane, he should have called him in his chambers where he can advise him privately rather than battering him with insulting remarks and embarrassing questions such as asking him from what school he came from publicly in the courtroom and in the presence of his clients. Humiliating a lawyer is highly reprehensible. It betrays the Judges lack of patience and temperance. A highly temperamental judge could hardly make decisions with equanimity. Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should always observe courtesy and civility. In addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid a controversial tone or a tone that creates animosity. Judges should always be aware that disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There must be mutual concession of respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be respected but free to insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by any of the following: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of reprimand. He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely

NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY (G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)

FACTS: Petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against the respondent Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations Trade and Commerce and National Defense and Security concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,5 and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt. ISSUES: (1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system; (2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege; (3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions; and (4) whether or not respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. HELD: 1. Yes, there Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege.Presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public," that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters"; and that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power - the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on he being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of governments which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. 2. Yes,there Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege. Communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege because the elements of the presidential communications privilege are present. A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power." The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive."Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of substance.On the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor.25 The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. The inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government by no means prescribes absolute autonomy in the discharge by each branch of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. There is the corollary doctrine of checks and balances, which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches. Thus, by analogy, the fact that certain legislative acts require action from the President for their validity does not render such acts less legislative in nature. A good example is the power to pass a law. Article VI, Section 27 of the Constitution mandates that every bill passed by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President who shall approve or veto the same. The fact that the approval or vetoing of the bill is lodged with the President does not render the power to pass law executive in nature. This is because the power to pass law is generally a quintessential and non-delegable power of the Legislature. In the same vein, the executive power to enter or not to enter into a contract to secure foreign loans does not become less executive in nature because of conditions laid down in the Constitution. The final decision in the exercise of the said executive power is still lodged in the Office of the President. B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive. In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family.In determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest; and in balancing respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information. It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality.It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s communication with her advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product of the meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency. The Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. The decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to answer the said questions. The COur discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is not an absolute right.Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of legislation, not the people’s right to public information. 3.Yes, respondent Committees failed to Show that the Communications Elicited by the three questions are critical to the exercise of their functions to reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees’ power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation.While it is true that no impeachment proceeding has been initiated, however, complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed against President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. As the Court has said earlier, the prosecutorial and judicial arms of government are the bodies equipped and mandated by the Constitution and our laws to determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly in the NBN Project are true and, if so, who should be prosecuted and penalized for criminal conduct. 4.Yes,respondent committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. Clearly, petitioner’s request to be furnished an advance copy of questions is a reasonable demand that should have been granted by respondent Committees. In the present case, the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review is warranted because there appears to be a clear abuse of the power of contempt on the part of respondent Committees. As we have stressed before, petitioner is not an unwilling witness, and contrary to the assertion of respondent Committees, petitioner did not assume that they no longer had any other questions for him. He repeatedly manifested his willingness to attend subsequent hearings and respond to new matters. His only request was that he be furnished a copy of the new questions in advance to enable him to adequately prepare as a resource person. WHEREFORE, respondent Committees’ Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is hereby DENIED.

GARCILLANO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008)

FACTS: In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA and COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the elections to favor GMA. The recordings then became subject to legislative hearings conducted separately by each House. In his privilege speech, Sen. Escudero motioned a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. Lacson’s motion for a senate inquiry was referred to the Committee on National Defense and Security headed by Biazon. Garcillano subsequently filed 2 petitions. One to prevent the playing of the tapes in the each house for they are alleged to be inadmissible and the other to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation. ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci. HELD: Garci’s petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted. The tapes were already played in Congress and those tapes were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by these incidents hence it has become moot and academic. The second petition must be granted however. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.” The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session. The petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.

ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST V PURISIMA (G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008)

FACTS: The petition for prohibition was filed to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.Petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. 2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President. 3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a congressional oversight committee. HELD: 1. NO. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the instrumentality through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions–taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection. 2.No. RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act.Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest. 3.The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic. The petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.

DAVID VS ARROYO (G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006)

FACTS:

Seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition was filed against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for
alleged commission of grave abuse of discretion when she issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General
Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5)- declaring state of emergency during the 20th anniversary celebration of the EDSA People Power 1.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind
the executive issuance was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People's Army
(NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.[4] They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present
danger. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve
democratic institutions,are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the
Constitution. According to them the issuance of the proclamation and general order is void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.


HELD:

Both are partly constitutional and unconstitutional.The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the
provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated
by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to
take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.
whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.Ó Considering
that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The Petitions are partly granted.