People v. Paguntalan (G.R. No. 116272, March 27, 1995)

FACTS: On April 25, 1993, Arturo Tiu was fatally shot by Noel “Bobong” Paguntalan during a religious procession in Barangay Linaot, Ormoc City. Immediately after shooting, Noel ran to the enclosed premises of his employer, the accused-appellant, Jesus Sotto. The latter was also found guilty for allegedly confederating with Paguntalan in killing the victim by persuading him and that the unlicensed firearms used in the commission of the crime was also his. The bits of circumstances shown and explained collectively indicate that Noel Paguntalan, Jesus Sotto, and one or more unindicated individuals acted in concert, had a common design and understanding to kill Arturo Tiu. Though no direct evidence of conspiracy is shown in the evidence, this does not detract from the fact that the act of Noel Paguntalan in killing Arturo Tiu is also an act of his coconspirators. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent, Jesus Sotto is criminally liable. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Jesus Sotto is not criminally liable. The trial court’s insinuation that the fascination of accused-appellant with Django movies, as manifested by his preoccupation of wearing a hat similar to the hat worn by Django in the movies, is adequate foundation to jump to the conclusion that he would likewise be obsessed in possessing a .22 revolver like that used by Django in the movies. This kind of all opposition typifies the tradition fallacy anchored on non-sequitur and verisimilitude. At this juncture, the court observed that the magistrate had stretched his imagination beyond the parameters of reason. Probability can never genre as substitute for the requisite quantum of proof to establish the factum probans as to the ownership of the fatal weapon. Jurisprudence of recent vintage intrude that before conviction can he had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime and that circumstantial evidence should be acted upon with extreme caution. In the case at bench, we entertain serious doubts as to the "fact of agreement", as the same is drawn form after-events and anchored as it is on unfounded conjectures. Indeed, conclusions based on speculations cannot serve as basis for conviction. The Court cannot also subscribe to the proposition of the trial court that the low economic status of the triggerman is enough to lay the basis for concluding that the gun could have been supplied by accused-appellant for it is just like saying that only accused-appellant can purchase or supply the gun to the exclusion of other persons financially capable of owning a gun. It must be recalled that the gun used was unlicensed and there was thus no record on the ownership thereof. With these evidences and circumstances, the appealed is REVERSED and ACQUITTING accused-appellant of the crime charged due to reasonable doubt.