HASHIMOTO v DALTON ( 870 F. Supp. 1544, 1994)

FACTS: Plaintiff, Barbara M. Hashimoto, was employed as a Budget Analyst, GS-7, at Camp H.M. Smith from April 2, 1984 through June 2, 1986. She brings this action, generally alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation during and after her former federal employment pursuant to 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16. Just prior to Plaintiff's removal due to a reduction in force (RIF) in June 1986, she initiated her first of two administrative complaints. In that complaint ("Case 1"), Plaintiff alleged that, because of her race and/or gender, she was suspended without pay on two occasions, denied a within grade salary increase, and eventually lost her job when her position was RIF-fed. Later, while her first complaint was being investigated, Plaintiff filed her second administrative complaint ("Case 2") in which she has alleged that she suffered a negative *1548 referral by one of her former Marine Corps supervisors when she applied for a job with the Army in retaliation for filing her Case I administrative complaint.Both administrative complaints were consolidated for investigation and were the subject of an adversarial hearing before an Administrative Judge from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). There were two jury trials of the Case 1 claims because, at the time of trial, the law of this circuit entitled Plaintiff to a jury trial. The first trial ended in a verdict for Plaintiff, but that verdict was vacated and a new trial ordered on numerous grounds.A second trial was held on Case 1 and Case 2 was also tried before a jury. The jury verdicts in Case 1 and Case 2 are vacated in light of the United States Supreme Court's ruling that the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which provided for jury trials and compensatory damages were not retroactive in application. The Court and the parties were aware that the United States Supreme Court had heard arguments on the issue of retro-activity at the time of the second trial of Case 1. In light of the pending decision on retro-activity, and in order to avoid a third trial in the interests of judicial efficiency and economy, the parties were instructed to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the plaintiff suffered discrimination RULING The employer's burden is satisfied if he simply explains what he has done'. No discrimination done with the plaintiff. The plaintiff has the initial burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a mere pretext for discrimination. The two Case 1 issues which remain for adjudication are whether Plaintiff suffered unlawful discrimination when she was suspended for fourteen days and when she was denied a within grade increase. In this case, Defendant clearly articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions taken: Plaintiff was suspended for fourteen days because she did not produce a turnover folder (in any format) as she had been instructed to do and she was denied a WGI because her performance had been rated as marginal. Plaintiff's other allegations that she was treated differently than others who were Caucasian and/or male were all decisively rebutted by evidence or are insufficiently indicative of any discriminatory animus. Because Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden as to any of the Case 1 claims she has presented, judgment is has been ordered for Defendant. Read full text of the Case here: