In Re Joaquin T. Borromeo

Facts: The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court. Case 1: Cases involving Traders Royal Bank (TRB). The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners. Case 2: Cases involving United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB. Case 3: Cases involving Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC). The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection. Issue: Whether the respondent-accused is liable for constructive contempt? Held: Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.

Santos, et al. vs. Aranzanso, et al., No. L-23828, February 28, 1966

Facts: A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old, was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila. It was alleged that both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and could not be found in spite of diligent efforts to locate them; that since the war said minors have been abandoned; and that for years since their infancy, said children have been continuously been in petitioners’ care and custody. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. After due publication and hearing, the adoption court granted the petition for the adoption. Subsequently – eight years later – Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the former, stating among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate. Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator, asserting among others that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos is void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them. Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the deceased and mother of Paulina opposed also the petition of Simplicio and adopted the pleadings filed by Aranzanso. The Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to make a collateral attack against the adoption decree on the ground of failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab initio. Issue: WON a decree of adoption could be assailed collaterally in a settlement proceeding. Held: No. Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was abandoned, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices. Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports “any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children.” Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order. Hence, the CA erred in reviewing under a collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of the adopted children had abandoned them.

Lambino vs COMELEC G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

FACTS: On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative; 2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and HELD: 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states: Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.” The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. 2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

HASHIMOTO v DALTON ( 870 F. Supp. 1544, 1994)

FACTS: Plaintiff, Barbara M. Hashimoto, was employed as a Budget Analyst, GS-7, at Camp H.M. Smith from April 2, 1984 through June 2, 1986. She brings this action, generally alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation during and after her former federal employment pursuant to 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16. Just prior to Plaintiff's removal due to a reduction in force (RIF) in June 1986, she initiated her first of two administrative complaints. In that complaint ("Case 1"), Plaintiff alleged that, because of her race and/or gender, she was suspended without pay on two occasions, denied a within grade salary increase, and eventually lost her job when her position was RIF-fed. Later, while her first complaint was being investigated, Plaintiff filed her second administrative complaint ("Case 2") in which she has alleged that she suffered a negative *1548 referral by one of her former Marine Corps supervisors when she applied for a job with the Army in retaliation for filing her Case I administrative complaint.Both administrative complaints were consolidated for investigation and were the subject of an adversarial hearing before an Administrative Judge from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). There were two jury trials of the Case 1 claims because, at the time of trial, the law of this circuit entitled Plaintiff to a jury trial. The first trial ended in a verdict for Plaintiff, but that verdict was vacated and a new trial ordered on numerous grounds.A second trial was held on Case 1 and Case 2 was also tried before a jury. The jury verdicts in Case 1 and Case 2 are vacated in light of the United States Supreme Court's ruling that the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which provided for jury trials and compensatory damages were not retroactive in application. The Court and the parties were aware that the United States Supreme Court had heard arguments on the issue of retro-activity at the time of the second trial of Case 1. In light of the pending decision on retro-activity, and in order to avoid a third trial in the interests of judicial efficiency and economy, the parties were instructed to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the plaintiff suffered discrimination RULING The employer's burden is satisfied if he simply explains what he has done'. No discrimination done with the plaintiff. The plaintiff has the initial burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a mere pretext for discrimination. The two Case 1 issues which remain for adjudication are whether Plaintiff suffered unlawful discrimination when she was suspended for fourteen days and when she was denied a within grade increase. In this case, Defendant clearly articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions taken: Plaintiff was suspended for fourteen days because she did not produce a turnover folder (in any format) as she had been instructed to do and she was denied a WGI because her performance had been rated as marginal. Plaintiff's other allegations that she was treated differently than others who were Caucasian and/or male were all decisively rebutted by evidence or are insufficiently indicative of any discriminatory animus. Because Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden as to any of the Case 1 claims she has presented, judgment is has been ordered for Defendant. Read full text of the Case here:

People v. Paguntalan (G.R. No. 116272, March 27, 1995)

FACTS: On April 25, 1993, Arturo Tiu was fatally shot by Noel “Bobong” Paguntalan during a religious procession in Barangay Linaot, Ormoc City. Immediately after shooting, Noel ran to the enclosed premises of his employer, the accused-appellant, Jesus Sotto. The latter was also found guilty for allegedly confederating with Paguntalan in killing the victim by persuading him and that the unlicensed firearms used in the commission of the crime was also his. The bits of circumstances shown and explained collectively indicate that Noel Paguntalan, Jesus Sotto, and one or more unindicated individuals acted in concert, had a common design and understanding to kill Arturo Tiu. Though no direct evidence of conspiracy is shown in the evidence, this does not detract from the fact that the act of Noel Paguntalan in killing Arturo Tiu is also an act of his coconspirators. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent, Jesus Sotto is criminally liable. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Jesus Sotto is not criminally liable. The trial court’s insinuation that the fascination of accused-appellant with Django movies, as manifested by his preoccupation of wearing a hat similar to the hat worn by Django in the movies, is adequate foundation to jump to the conclusion that he would likewise be obsessed in possessing a .22 revolver like that used by Django in the movies. This kind of all opposition typifies the tradition fallacy anchored on non-sequitur and verisimilitude. At this juncture, the court observed that the magistrate had stretched his imagination beyond the parameters of reason. Probability can never genre as substitute for the requisite quantum of proof to establish the factum probans as to the ownership of the fatal weapon. Jurisprudence of recent vintage intrude that before conviction can he had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime and that circumstantial evidence should be acted upon with extreme caution. In the case at bench, we entertain serious doubts as to the "fact of agreement", as the same is drawn form after-events and anchored as it is on unfounded conjectures. Indeed, conclusions based on speculations cannot serve as basis for conviction. The Court cannot also subscribe to the proposition of the trial court that the low economic status of the triggerman is enough to lay the basis for concluding that the gun could have been supplied by accused-appellant for it is just like saying that only accused-appellant can purchase or supply the gun to the exclusion of other persons financially capable of owning a gun. It must be recalled that the gun used was unlicensed and there was thus no record on the ownership thereof. With these evidences and circumstances, the appealed is REVERSED and ACQUITTING accused-appellant of the crime charged due to reasonable doubt.

SY V FINEZA A.M. No. RTJ-03-1808. October 15, 2003

FACTS: A complaint filed by Radelia C. Sy with the Office of the Court Administrator, charging the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Branch 131), Judge Antonio J. Fineza, of bribery, grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a judge and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Petitioner Sy is accused of estafa and her case is pending before Judge Fineza. According to the petitioner, respondent, Judge Fineza, exerted undue and improper pressure on her by offering to dismiss the estafa case in exchange for P300,000. Otherwise, he threatened to convict complainant Sy of estafa regardless of her innocence. The second complaint further alleged that on May 23, 2001 complainant Sys counsel in other cases, Atty. Jubay, had relayed to her that Judge Fineza warned him that morning during a hearing that she had not been paying her other lawyers. Judge Fineza added that complainant Sy had been threatening to file a case against the former, and warned that if she does so, she could no longer appear or set foot in Caloocan City. This eventually led to the withdrawal of Atty. Jubay as complainant Sys counsel. Complainant Sy declared that she delivered money to Judge Fineza six times on separate occasions. Complainant Sy claimed that when she was unable to complete the remaining balance, Judge Fineza began harassing her. ISSUE: Whether the respondent has breached the norms and standards of the judiciary RULING: After assessing the pleadings and memoranda filed, along with the documents and affidavits attached, the investigating Justice saw no merit in the charge of bribery but found Judge Fineza guilty of simple misconduct. As found by the Supreme Court, bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, thus complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Complainant herein has only her friends to support her claims who would naturally testify in her favor. These two incidents clearly show Judge Finezas utter disrespect for the office he holds as a member of the judiciary. In the first instance, even assuming the absence of shouting, finger pointing and menacing stares, the admitted act of Judge Fineza in calling complainant Cato sinungaling in the hallway, already detracts from the equanimity and judiciousness that are required of a judge. As for describing one of the complainants witnesses as BAKLA in a pleading filed before this Court, resort to argumentum ad hominem is certainly most unbecoming of a judge, to say the least. While Judge Fineza denies that the conversation ever happened, the manifestation of Atty. Jubay cannot easily be dismissed as a fabrication. It was made by an officer of the court who could be held liable for contempt if the same is proven to be false. At this point, it bears noting that the manifestation was filed with the court of Judge Fineza and that he made no mention of ever having imposed sanctions on Atty. Jubay for making such allegations The integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have done justice. The assumption of office by a judge places upon him duties and restrictions peculiar to his exalted position. He must be perceived, not as a repository of arbitrary power, but as one who dispenses justice under the sanction of the rule of law. This Court has repeatedly reminded members of the judiciary to be irreproachable in conduct and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties, but also in their daily life. For no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. Respondent Judge Fineza is given one last chance to correct his ways and is sternly warned that one more transgression will merit his dismissal from the service. Respondent Judge Fineza is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) months, with the STERN WARNING that one more transgression will merit dismissal from the service.

MANE V JUDGE BELEN A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner Attorney Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the Office of the Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, of demeaning, humiliating, and berating him during the hearing on a case which he was a counsel for the plaintiff. In proving his claim, he cited remarks made by respondent in the course of the proceeding conducted. Respondent judge criticized the petitioner on the ground that he did not graduated from University of the Philippines College of Law. Based on the transcript of the stenographic notes, the respondent made also a threatening and boastful remarks to petitioner who is admittedly still young, unnecessary lecturing and debating, as well as unnecessary display of learning and showed a conceited display of arrogance as to the petitioner’s motion. Petitioner later withdrew his complaint, by letter of September 4, 2006, stating that it was a mere result of his impulsiveness. ISSUE: 1.Whether or not the statements and actions made by the respondent judge during the said hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. RULING: Respondent judge is guilty of conduct unbecoming during the trial. An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. The court ruled that Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and language. The OCA thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. Canon Rule 3.04 states that a judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants. A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent felt that his integrity and dignity were being assaulted, he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse. In this case, respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of the motion to inhibit filed by complainant, but, instead, he opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. If respondent judge felt that there is a need to admonish complainant Atty. Mane, he should have called him in his chambers where he can advise him privately rather than battering him with insulting remarks and embarrassing questions such as asking him from what school he came from publicly in the courtroom and in the presence of his clients. Humiliating a lawyer is highly reprehensible. It betrays the Judges lack of patience and temperance. A highly temperamental judge could hardly make decisions with equanimity. Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should always observe courtesy and civility. In addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid a controversial tone or a tone that creates animosity. Judges should always be aware that disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There must be mutual concession of respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be respected but free to insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by any of the following: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of reprimand. He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely